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pages. $95.00. ISBN: 978-1-137-34787-9.

Reviewed by Marilyn Fischer
UNIVERSIT Y OF DAY TON, FISCHER@UDAY TON.EDU

Fischer casts a wide net in seeking a conception of change
with which to understand feminist transformation of both
self and social institutions. She explores metaphysical,
epistemological, ethical, and political theories of change in
developing a feminist-pragmatist approach. Writing clearly
and carefully, Fischer employs her knowledge of relevant
primary and secondary texts deftly. She has a particularly
admirable ability to appreciate what various philosophers
have to offer while honestly appraising and seeking
remedies for weaknesses in their theories.
Part I, “Genealogical Reflections on Change,” contains
three chapters. The first, “Women, Change, and the Birth
of Philosophy,” sets up why a feminist account of change
is needed. Fischer begins with Parmenides and the
ambiguous role of the goddess in his poem, “On Nature.”
She pairs this with analyses of the a-sexual birth of Athena
as Athen’s creation myth, Pandora’s evil interventions into
the harmonious all-male world, and Aristotle’s gendered
account of reproduction. This gives strong support to
Fischer’s claim that, in Greek myth and philosophy, women
occupy a role she calls gendered (im)mutability. If change
is illusory or bad, women are active agents responsible for
evil. If change is good, women are passive and not fully
human.
Chapter two, “Change in Dewey’s and Aristotle’s
Metaphysics,” compares Dewey’s and Aristotle’s accounts
of how the world exhibits both change and stability. For
example, seasons and individuals undergo constant change,
but they do so in fairly stable and predictable patterns.
While fully acknowledging differences between Aristotle’s
teleological hylomorphism and Dewey’s emphasis on nonteleological interaction among organisms and environment,
Fischer is particularly struck by the two thinkers’ affinities.
Both are naturalists and work out the relation between
change and stability within nature, without appealing to the
transcendent realm. Fischer concludes first, that Dewey’s
account of change owes much to Aristotle, and second,
that Dewey’s differences from Aristotle give an opening
for using Dewey’s metaphysics toward construction of
a feminist analysis of the self. The chapter itself contains
little feminist analysis. If read as a compare and contrast
essay, the chapter is very well done and supports the
second conclusion. I am not convinced by Fischer’s first
conclusion, however. Both philosophers were working
within the scientific theories of their time. While Dewey
had studied Aristotle, he wrote in an era when Darwin’s
evolutionary theory served as the generative metaphor
in every discipline. Dewey could well have developed
his theory using the intellectual resources of his time. A
different sort of argument is needed to show that affinities
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between Dewey and Aristotle indicate actual lineage and
are more than interesting points of overlap.
Chapter three, “Change in Dewey’s and Aristotle’s Self,”
examines Dewey’s and Aristotle’s ethics. Again, Fischer
uses the many affinities between the two accounts to claim
that Dewey’s ethics should be understood as Aristotelian.
Both conceive of the self as inherently social, both find
ethics and politics inseparable, and both conceive of
character as formed via the development of habits.
Fischer points out, however, that differences between the
two views are crucial in making Dewey’s conception of the
self a suitable starting point for constructing a feminist
self. Aristotle places humans into a natural hierarchy,
with all women and some men inferior to a class of elite,
rational males. With Dewey’s interactionist view of the
relation between self and environment, the self is more
fluid. My reading of this chapter is the same as for chapter
two. As a compare and contrast essay, it is very well
done. However, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, theorists working within evolutionary paradigms
commonly used the basic terms with which Dewey
constructed his theory of the self. They often described
society as an organism, considered morality as largely
based on custom, and understood animal and human
behavior in terms of habits. Because Fischer does not
assess whether Dewey could have derived his conception
of the self from within the evolutionary theorizing of his
day, her claim that Dewey based much of his conception
on Aristotle is unconvincing.
Part II, “Feminist-Pragmatist Reconstruction of Change”
(chapters four and five), takes Dewey’s conception of the
self, reconstructs it with a feminist lens, and uses that
to address possibilities for feminist democratic change.
Now there are many ways to structure a monograph,
from a collection of separate articles that share common
themes, to an integrated whole. I read the book as closer
to the former. Linkage between the two parts depends on
Fischer’s claim that Dewey to a significant extent drew his
metaphysics and ethics from Aristotle. Had Fischer placed
her presentation of Dewey’s conception of the self in Part
II rather than Part I, Part II could be read separately. This is
not a criticism as much as an observation about how the
book is constructed.
Chapter four, “The Feminist-Pragmatist Self,” looks for a
conception of the self that can account for the experience
some women have of coming to feminist consciousness.
They sometimes report that for a period of time everything
seemed to be a jumbled confusion, and they emerged
totally transformed. Fischer begins with Dewey’s model of
the social self, formed in interaction with the environment.
Habits formed as adaptations to the environment give
stability, yet often are flexible enough to change. Fischer
explicates coming to feminist consciousness in terms of
substituting habits of perceiving situations through feminist
lenses for non-feminist perceptual habits. The process is
gradual, beginning with a few habits which then interact
with and lead to change in more habits; hence the period
of confusion. Fischer stresses the need for careful selfreflection, especially to bring unconscious non-feminist
habits into conscious awareness. While what Fischer does
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is thoroughly laid out, she could have put more stress
on how action and reflection are constantly intertwined.
Experimenting with feminist actions, even if one is not fully
convinced, is often a crucial part of the process, and gives
a supply of materials to reflect on.
The final chapter, “Democracy and Change as Transaction,”
takes feminist consciousness into the political arena. How
should a feminist self think about and try to bring about
change in oppressive social institutions? Fischer clarifies
how for feminists and pragmatists, the dualisms separating
ethics from politics and the private from the public sphere
do not hold. Personal identity is socially embedded
and always functions in interaction with public spaces
and meanings. Fischer appreciates Dewey’s model of
democracy as cooperative inquiry. She supplements it with
Iris Young’s model of inclusive participatory democracy,
finding Young more attuned than Dewey to variations
in communicative style, and thus more open to women
and other non-dominant groups. Concerned that Young’s
focus on procedural matters makes her deliberators thin
and ethereal, Fischer supplements Young’s model with
Jane Addams’s story of how many of the old immigrant
women living in her Chicago neighborhood found meaning
and comfort in the “devil baby,” rumored to be residing
at Hull House. Addams’s open receptivity and sympathetic
understanding enabled her to find wisdom in people with
vastly different communicative styles, belief systems, and
patterns of living. Fischer moves nimbly among these
models and makes a good case for bringing them together.
I wish Fischer had said more about how becoming able to
do what Young advocates and Addams demonstrates, is a
matter of developing habits of listening and understanding
that take much time and practice to acquire. All the same,
as in previous chapters, Fischer works carefully and
appreciatively with her material. The model she develops
is worthy of serious consideration.
An author cannot cover everything in one book. There are
implications of the feminist-pragmatist self not addressed
that I hope Fischer and/or others will explore in the future.
Now I speak as an insider. I find the feminist-pragmatist
conception of the self and of the process of change more
convincing than alternative constructions. Yet, there are
disquieting implications. On this view, radical change in the
self and in social institutions is impossible. For pragmatists,
both selves and institutions are bundles of habits. Change,
unless violently imposed, occurs piecemeal, through
working on a few habits at a time. The conception thus has
a built-in conservatism to it. While at a given point in time
one may work toward feminist consciousness or feminist
institutional change in terms of a few habits, at the same
time, untransformed habits continue to function, and
continue to reinforce the status quo. Change is tenuous
and can often be undone. On this view, it is understandable
why the promise of the women’s rights and the civil rights
movements of the 1960s remains unrealized a half century
later. For a feminist-pragmatist conception of change, this
is a sober and sometimes tragic reality. It is not a “problem”
that can be fixed within the theory.
Regardless of whether the book is read as a collection of
essays or as an integrated whole, the chapters are skillfully
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written and many issues are thoughtfully addressed.
Fischer’s achievement is impressive.
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Margaret Holmgren’s Forgiveness and Retribution:
Responding to Wrongdoing is a refreshingly bold attempt
to argue for an unpopular, often marginalized position
within the forgiveness literature: that unconditional
forgiveness and self-forgiveness are always morally
appropriate, even when an offender has not apologized.
Holmgren presents the “paradigm of forgiveness” as a way
of responding to wrongdoing that is opposed to “attitudinal
retributivism,” which she characterizes as the idea that
“enduring attitudes of resentment and self-condemnation
are morally appropriate under certain circumstances” (5).
Holmgren argues that such attitudes of resentment and
self-condemnation are never appropriate.
In chapter one, Holmgren offers an outline of her project
and provides an initial characterization of the attitudinal
retributivist position that forms her target throughout the
work. Attitudinal retributivists, on Holmgren’s account,
argue that forgiveness is inappropriate or even blameworthy
in circumstances where an offender has not apologized
or repented. This is because granting forgiveness to an
offender without his apology can demonstrate that the
victim lacks of self-respect, lacks respect for the offender,
or lacks a general respect for the demands of morality
(9). Holmgren then proceeds to argue that adopting an
attitude of “unconditional genuine forgiveness” not only
demonstrates self-respect, respect for the offender, and
respect for morality, but meets these criteria more fully and
completely than attitudinal retributivism (9).
Holmgren characterizes unconditional genuine forgiveness
as a virtue—which she defines as an ingrained, integrated
attitude. In chapter two, Holmgren contrasts the attitude
that forms the paradigm of forgiveness with those that
form the paradigm of retribution and argues for the moral
superiority of the attitude of forgiveness. For Holmgren,
attitudes have a cognitive component, an affective
component, and a motivational component (23). For an
individual to possess the complete, integrated attitude of
forgiveness, one must form the belief that the offender is
a sentient being and moral agent who, as such, deserves
respect and compassion (33); one must feel such kindness
and compassion toward the offender; and one must actually
desire that the offender flourish (34). While adopting the
attitude of resentment involves withdrawing goodwill
toward the offender until she either makes amends or some
other conditions have been met, adopting the attitude of
forgiveness involves no withdrawal of goodwill at any point.
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